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Introduction 
Concessionary rural credit programs are often perceived as a means of reducing 
poverty and increasing rural productivity in many low income nations. Unfortunately, 
these programs have a history of default and delinquency. The inability of financial 
institutions (Fis) to recover concessionary loans endangers their long-term viability. At 
the same time, defaults also restrict the availability of funds for lending to new borrowers 
or to current borrowers who are in good standing. Funds for new loans must then come 
from the government or from donors. As a result the Fis further distance themselves 
from their customers (both depositors and borrowers) and increase their dependency on 
outside funds. 
Much of the early literature addressing the loan recovery problem concentrated 
on loan recipient characteristics or farm level causes, and largely ignored the Fis' role 
in the recovery process. Defaults were often explained by the borrowers' inability or 
unwillingness to repay loans [Donald].1 Borrowers were considered unable to repay loans 
either because they mis-allocated the funds borrowed or the funded activity did not 
generate sufficient funds for repayment. It was often argued that subsidized loans were 
mis-allocated for consumption rather than for production purposes; i.e., to cover costs of 
1 A more detailed discussion of these studies is presented in Boakye-
Dankwa; Christen; Montiel; and Von Pischke 1980. 
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celebrations, illnesses, funerals or other social expenses, or to repay loans previously 
obtained from moneylenders. This so-called non-productive use of subsidized credit was 
one of the first explanations given for high rural default rates. A second reason centered 
on the borrowers' inability to generate sufficient income to repay their loans, often 
because they were too poor. These explanations were associated with acts of God 
(floods, drought, pestilence) and/or related to the absence of profitable investments in 
agricultural production (often due to the price control policies enacted by the 
government), inefficient markets, poor planning and low educational levels. 
Other delinquent borrowers were identified as being unwilling to repay their loans 
even though they had sufficient funds for meeting their contractual obligations. Causes 
for willful default were frequently associated with a political environment that led 
borrowers to think of subsidized loans as gifts rather than as loans requiring repayment. 
Borrowers perceived these "loans" as gifts in return for supporting a particular regime or 
candidate. Wealthier borrowers were able to intimidate bank officers, legal officials, 
judges, and the Fl's board of directors and, thus, ignore the repayment of their loans. 
These borrowers are usually recipients of large loans. The lack of ethical stimuli 
encouraging loan repayment, of legal sanctions to punish defaulters, of loan supervision 
by Fis, and the high costs Fis faced in attempting to punish defaulters were other factors 
identified as contributing to willful default. 
By the late 1970s, however, the concepts of Shaw and McKinnon concerning the 
importance of finance in development gained acceptance and researchers studying loan 
recovery began to turn their attention from the behavior of borrowers to the actions of 
lenders. This led to the view that "the failures of subsidized rural credit are frequently 
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laid at the feet of the institutions that were created to manage it" [Braverman and 
Guash, p. 1253]. Poor recovery was linked to institutional factors such as the low 
interest rates charged on targeted loans, the high transactions cost and credit rationing 
caused by interest rate ceilings, the absence of savings mobilization in many Fis, the 
reliance on outside funds (national treasuries or foreign donors) for loans, the practice 
of basing loan size on production cost formulas rather than on borrower debt capacity, 
and rewarding loan officers for the volume of loans made rather than for the quality of 
loans made. Researchers also began to argue that solutions to recovery problems were 
more likely to be found in institutional reform rather than by individual defaulter 
repentance [Christen; Cuevas and Graham; Montiel; Takroni; Van Steenwyck]. For 
example, one author reported that financial institutions lending their own deposits have 
better recovery rates than institutions dependent on outside sources of funds [Christen]. 
Another study concluded that issues concerning willful default are better addressed 
through actions to increase the lender's willingness to collect rather than through the 
borrower's willingness to repay [Maharjan, et. al.]. 
This paper reports on an attempt to test the degree to which factors associated 
with FI collection efficiency affect loan recovery. Although a causal relationship is 
difficult to prove, bank factors are important since they "set the groundwork in providing 
the farmers the opportunity to repay their loans" [TBAC, p. 35]. Few empirical studies 
have addressed this topic. 
In this study, Bangladesh bank branch data are analyzed following the approach 
used in a study conducted by the Technical Board for Agricultural Credit (TBAC) of the 
Philippines. This Bangladesh study is particularly relevant because it utilizes a 
I 
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representative sample of public bank branches operating in rural areas. These branches 
are owned and operated by the agricultural development bank (BKB) and four 
nationalized commercial banks (NCBs). All of these banks were regulated by a supply-
leading credit policy that assigned a volume of loans that banks were encouraged to 
make during the year. The paper opens with a brief discussion of lending and recovery 
' I 
of rural loans by the Bangladesh financial system. The remainder of the paper describes 
the data, the model specification, and the empirical results. It concludes with a brief 
summary of the major findings. 
Lending and Recovery of Rural Loans in Bangladesh 
The Bangladesh financial system is made up of an extensive branch banking 
network. Presently four nationalized commercial banks (NCBs) and the agricultural 
development bank (BKB) hold the largest share of formal loans and deposits in the rural 
financial system [Srinivasan and Meyer, 1987]. During the second half of the 1970s, the 
government made a concerted effort to increase the flow of formal credit to rural areas. 
First, these public banks were required to open two rural bank branches for each urban 
branch created. Secondly, the government implemented subsidized loan targeting 
programs, whereby the Bangladesh Bank (the central bank) assigned each bank an 
amount of credit to be disbursed during the year [Ahmed]. Banks lending under this 
program were granted access to the rediscount window of the Bangladesh Bank. 
These efforts resulted in a rapid expansion of the country's rural banking system. 
The number of rural bank branches increased from about 500 in 1975 to over 3,000 in 
1984. Proportionally, rural branches grew from almost half of the total bank branches 
in 1975 to two-thirds in 1984. At the same time, the nominal volume of agricultural 
.. 
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credit disbursed per year increased from $ 57 million to almost $ 462 million between 
these years. Concurrently, the nominal volume of rural deposits mobilized increased from 
$ 106 million to $ 489 million or from eight percent of total bank deposits to 17 percent 
during this period [Ahmed]. The rural loan disbursal process was further accelerated 
by the creation, in the early 1980's, of local credit committees, Upazila Agricultural 
Credit Commissions (UACCs). Each UACC was comprised of local politicians and elites 
with the participating branch manager served as its recording secretary. Upon receipt 
of an UACC approved loan application, the branch was required by law to disburse the 
loan funds within a week. 
Several factors help explain the poor recovery experience of rural branches 
disbursing agricultural loans. First, the branches tended to be understaffed compared to 
the volume of loans disbursed. Branch personnel have been poorly trained in the 
supervision of agricultural loans. The majority of their training emphasized the proper 
documentation procedures for disbursing loans rather than emphasizing appropriate 
recovery procedures [Ahmed]. Secondly, recovery efforts were hindered by the UACCs 
in two ways: the committees ignored the branch personnel's acquired skills in the 
borrower selection process for short-term agricultural loans; and, the UACCs assumed 
no responsibility for the recovery of the loans they approved. Loan recovery was the 
responsibility of the branch disbursing the loan [USAID]. Consequently, the branch 
officers had no leverage over UACC members to ensure that funds were disbursed to 
creditworthy borrowers. By 1986 these commissions ceased functioning and branch 
personnel once again gained full responsibility for selecting their borrower clientele. 
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Since 1984, the level of loan delinquency and default in Bangladesh accelerated in large 
part due to government loan and interest forgiveness programs [Navin]. 
Bangladesh banks report interest earnings on an accrual basis rather than the 
actual interest payments received. Regulators do not appear to enforce writing-off old, 
inactive loans; therefore, these loans remain classified as outstanding so bank income is 
inflated by large amounts of accrued interest. These accounting procedures cloud the 
magnitude of the banks' recovery problem, since defaulted loans are maintained for their 
income generating properties. Consequently, the volume of loans outstanding of banks 
operating in this type of regulatory environment should not be used as a proxy for their 
loan portfolio. Almost all the sampled branches had operating expenses higher than their 
operating income. However, over three-quarters of them reported positive net incomes, 
implying that their reported interest income was greater than their interest expenses. 
Seven years of official recovery data for agricultural loans in Bangladesh are 
presented in Table 1. These recovery rates measure amounts recovered during the year 
as a percentage of the amounts coming due during the year plus overdues including 
principal and interest due, i.e., the collection ratio. During this period the banking 
system as a whole recovered less than half the amount of loans coming due and overdue. 
The bank-wide recovery position peaked in 1980/1981 with a reported recovery rate of 
49 percent. Clearly the vitality of the rural, if not the entire, financial system in 
Bangladesh is threatened by widespread loan defaults. It is reported that the better 
recovery position of BKB over the NCBs can be explained, in part, by a practice of 
refinancing overdue loans (old loans were repaid using funds from newly disbursed loans). 
. ' 
8 
During 1984/85 this practice was stopped and consequently the BK.B's recovery position 
suffered [Gregory and Adams]. 
Table 1: Official Agricultural Loan Recovery Position 
by Bank and by Year* 
Bank Year 
197809 1979L80 1980L81 1981L82 1982L83 1983L84 1984L85 1985L86 
(Percent) 
Agrani 41 30 27 28 34 37 37 24 
Jana ta 53 32 3S 39 43 33 32 25 
Rupali 2S 23 15 34 10 2S 17 14 
Sonali 48 36 38 31 37 39 32 22 
BKB S4 56 68 68 so so 44 31 
Total 4S 42 49 48 42 42 38 26 
* Recovery is measured as loan payments received (LR) by the bank during a 
given period as a percent of loans due during that period (LD) plus previous 
overdues (LPD). Symbolically this percentage is LR/(LD+LPD). 
Source: Bangladesh Bank, Agricultural Credit Department. Unpublished data. 
Data Used 
This study of loan recovery utilizes survey data collected during late 1985 and 
early 1986 from branch managers in 101 rural branches. It was part of the research 
conducted under the Rural Financial Markets project of United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), and was titled the Rural Bank and Bank User 
Survey (RBBUS). The data were collected from branches located in the eight major 
political divisions utilized prior to 1983. The branches represent a stratified random 
sample of approximately 3,300 rural branches operating in Bangladesh when the survey 
was designed. Owing to missing values, the number of branches included in the models 
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tested was 82.2 The distribution of branches of the four NCBs include: Agrani Bank-
-17 branches; Janata Bank--11 branches; Rupali Bank--6 branches; Sonali Bank--24 
branches. Information from 24 BKB branches was included in the models. 
The survey collected portfolio information from each branch on the loans made 
during the years 1979 to 1984. However, the survey only contained deposit information 
for 1984. Since the loan-to-deposit ratio is utilized as an explanatory variable for the 
models estimated in this paper, only the data for loans made during 1984 were utilized. 
Rural bank branches in Bangladesh also make non-agricultural loans; thus, the survey 
divided a branch's loan portfolio into the two categories of agricultural and non-
agricultural loans. Agricultural loans represented 85 percent of the outstanding loans in 
an average branch's portfolio [Table A]. Unfortunately, the data base lacks information 
concerning the amount of loans coming due each year and the value of the portfolio's 
overdue loans. These shortcomings resulted in a less than desirable definition of the 
collection ratio for the recovery measure. This problem is discussed in the following 
section. 
Specification of Variables3 
Two loan recovery measures representing amount recovered and some form of 
recovery ratio are generally reported by financial institutions. Both recovery measures 
will be used as dependent variables in the models developed in this study. The first 
dependent variable shows the amount of funds recovered and was measured in two ways: 
2 Seven of the 101 branches did not make loans during 1984 and were 
excluded from the analysis. 
3 Descriptive information of the variables included in the models are 
presented in Table 2. 
10 
AG VOL COLL, measures the volume of agricultural loans collected by the branch, and 
- -
the second, TOT_ VOL_ COLL, measures the amount collected for all loans in the port-
folio. The volume of funds recovered includes all payments received during the reporting 
period; i.e., overdue loan principal, interest and penalty payments; due loan principal and 
interest payments; and, the early payment of loan principal and interest. A total of Tk. 
24.3 million were recovered by the 82 branches during 1984 4 of which 87 percent were 
agricultural loan repayments. The average amounts recovered by these branches was Tk. 
980,000 and Tk. 1,429,000 for agricultural and total loan payments received, respectively. 
The median amounts recovered were substantially lower than the average: Tk. 569,000 
and Tk. 793,000, respectively. The disparity between the mean and median amounts 
recovered imply that some branches were collecting sizable repayments while others were 
not, thus skewing the distribution of these variables [Cookson]. 
The second recovery measure, the collection ratio, suffers from a great variation 
in definition and measurement across studies. The numerator of the ratio is defined as 
some form of payments received by the Fis, while the denominator measures the 
amounts owed for repaymlent during the reporting period. The lack of a consistent 
definition for this ratio among Fis makes it virtually impossible to do straight forward 
comparisons of the recovery position between different countries or even between Fis 
operating in the same country. For example, the collection ratio utilized by the TBAC 
study compares the loans collected to the loans granted during the period under study. 
The Bangladesh Bank Agricultural Credit Department's (ACD) definition of the collection 
4 Taka (Tk.) is the monetary unit of Bangladesh. It means rupee in 
Bengal. The average 1984 exchange rate was $1 = Tk. 24.88. 
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ratio is payments received during the period, or the recovery amount, divided by the 
I 
loans and charges due and past due for the reporting period. Both the numerator and 
denominator include interest and penalty payments and charges in addition to the loan 
principal. 
The difference between the TBAC and the ACD collection ratios illustrates the 
difficulty of trying to compare the ratios of two different Fis. The numerator of the 
TBAC measure contains interest payments while the denominator does not. 
Consequently, for a FI included in the TBAC study to have 100 percent recovery of its 
funds due, its collection ratio would have to be greater than one, since the numerator 
includes interest payments. The ratio would be even larger if overdue loan payments 
were also received during the reporting period. It is not uncommon for financial 
intermediaries to manipulate these definitions or choose the one that will reflect the best 
or highest possible recovery position. 
In addition to the issue of whether or not interest earnings should be included in 
the collection ratio (if they are, they need to be included in both the numerator and the 
denominator of the ratio), other questions that arise when interpreting this ratio include: 
Are rescheduled loans included in the numerator and removed from the denominator? 
Are loans in arrears included in the denominator? How are prepayments treated? All 
these factors affect the calculation of the collection ratio and may cause the reporting 
institution to present a distorted recovery position. In addition, if past overdues represent 
a large proportion of a bank's loan portfolio, its reported recovery rate will decline even 
though it may be recovering its current loans as they come due. For the collection ratio 
' , 
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to be a meaningful measurement technique, it must be accompanied by a policy of 
writing-off old overdue loans [Von Pischke 1977). 
This study was unable to utilize the ACD collection ratio because information 
concerning loans coming due, overdue loans and interest payments due was not available 
from the sampled branches. Consequently, the collection ratio employed by the TBAC 
study, funds recovered divided by funds disbursed, was utilized as the second dependent 
variable of the estimated models. AG_ REC_ RA TE is the ratio of payments received to 
amounts disbursed during 1984 for agricultural loans alone. The second ratio, 
TOT_ REC_ RA TE, is the ratio of total amount of payments received to total amount 
disbursed for all loans during the year, which is equivalent to the TBAC collection ratio 
of the branch's loan portfolio. 
The mean values for AG_ REC_ RATE and TOT_ REC_ RATE are .49 and .50, 
respectively. The national average for AG_ REC_ RATE in 1984 was .44 [unpublished 
ACD report]. The median values for these two variables are lower, .29 and .34, 
respectively. Only nine branches had recovery ratios greater than one. However, these 
branches reduced the amount of credit they disbursed during 1984, thus distorting their 
collection ratio. The low recovery rates of the 82 branches, based on this poor recovery 
measure, further accentuates the non-sustainability of the Bangladesh rural banking 
system without outside funding. 
The collection performance of a branch will be partially explained by the following 
factors: the number of agricultural loans disbursed during the period (#_AG_ LNS), the 
value of agricultural loans outstanding including overdue loans and the interest due for 
the end of the period studied (AG_ LNS _OUTS), the manpower resources or personnel 
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of the branch (PERS), the age of the branch (BR_ AGE), the years of banking experience 
of the branch manager (BM_ EXP), the loan target amount assigned to the branch 
(TARGET), and the branch's operating efficiency. Three different branch financial ratios, 
loans to deposits (LNS _TO_ DEP), operating income to operating expense 
(OPY_TO_OPEXP) and net income to gross income (NE1Y_TO_GRSY), as well as the 
branch's net income (BR_ NET _Y), were used to measure branch operating efficiency. 
Finally, a dummy variable (BANK1YPE) was included to test whether the collection 
efficiency of the NCB branches was significantly different from the BKB branches, where 
BANKTYPE= 1 represents a NCB branch. Based on ACD data, the expected sign of 
the coefficient of this variable is negative. 
Short-term agricultural loan recipients represent the majority of borrowers in 
branch loan portfolios [Gregory and Adams]. While the bank personnel spent little time 
in borrower selection for short-term agricultural loans, time and effort were spent in 
filling out borrower information forms, disbursing and recording the loans, interest 
accumulations and payments, as well as filling out reports required by head offices and 
foreign donors. The more agricultural loans a branch makes, the less time branch 
personnel have to devote to recovery activities. Consequently, the more loans a branch 
makes during the year, the poorer its recovery position may be, or, #_AG_ LNS's 
estimated coefficient would have a negative sign. On the other hand, small agricultural 
borrowers have been shown to often have better repayment records than do larger 
borrowers. One explanation is their lack of political clout, so they cannot coerce bank 
personnel into granting them new loans while still delinquent on old ones. Another 
reason is that small borrowers are more apt to repay their loans to maintain their 
. ' 
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eligibility for future loans [Christen; Cookson; Maharjan, et. al.; Montiel]. Based on 
these findings, the sign of #_AG_ LNS's estimated coefficient may be positive. The 
sample median for this variable was 482 loans disbursed during 1984 while the mean was 
739 loans. The number of loans disbursed by the 82 branches during this period ranged 
from five to 3,259 loans. 
The recovery success of a branch may be measured by the value of a its 
outstanding agricultural loans (AG_ LNS _OUTS). Since branches rarely write-off bad 
loans, old overdue loans remain on the branches' balance sheets as outstanding. 
Overdues represent at least one-third of the loans outstanding for the combined five 
banks surveyed in this study [unpublished ACD report]. Therefore, a negative sign for 
the AG_ LNS _OUTS coefficient may imply that the sample branches do not have much 
success in recovering their agricultural loans. The sign is uncertain for the models using 
the volume collected dependent variables (AG_ VOL_ COLL and TOT_ VOL_ COLL). 
The value of outstanding agricultural loans ranged between Tk. 15,000 and Tk. 29,721,000 
for the sample as a whole. 
The Philippines study reports that "there is evidence that the number of personnel 
is a determinant of loan repayment. Employing a greater number of personnel seems 
to have a favorable effect on past due and repayment rates ... " [TBAC, p. 91]. Other 
studies have reported that better recovery is achieved by more loan supervision and by 
banks providing reminders to borrowers that loans are due or past due [Kim; Maharjan, 
~]. These steps require a sizeable amount of time; therefore in order to increase 
recovery levels more branch personnel may be required so the sign of the estimated 
PERS coefficient is expected to be positive. At the time of the survey, the number of 
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branch personnel was largely a function of deposit mobilization rather than the total 
size and number of loans and deposits. The number of people working in the sampled 
branches ranged between 4 and 35 people. 
The average age of the sampled branches was eight years while their median age 
was seven years. Overall, the ages of the branches included in this study ranged from 
two to 21 years of operation. The longer the branch is in operation, the broader is its 
customer base. Over time, the community becomes better acquainted with the financial 
services the branch offers and branch personnel collect saving and spending information 
on potential borrowers. Therefore, a branch's age is hypothesized to positively influence 
loan collection. 
The same is true for the number of years the branch manager has in banking, 
(BM_ EXP), i.e., the branches of more experienced managers are expected to have better 
recovery rates. For the sample, the branch managers had an average 6.5 years of 
experience while the median was 6 years of banking experience. Overall, the sampled 
branch managers had between one and 18 years experience. 
The branch's assigned loan target (TARGET) was included in the models since the 
greater the target volume, the more time and effort branch personnel must expend on 
loan disbursal and the less time they have to devote to loan collection. The loan target 
is hypothesized to be negatively related to loan recovery. The loan targets assigned to 
the sampled branches ranged between no loan target and Tk. 27,772,000. The sample 
average loan target (Tk. 3,687,000) was more than three times as large as the median 
value. 
' ' 
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The loan-to-deposit ratio (LNS _TO_ DEP) is the first management efficiency 
variable included in the model. This variable measures the proportion of total-loans-to-
total-deposits for the branch or the ability of the branch to meet its loan demands with 
deposits, i.e., its liquidity position. It illustrates how dependent a branch is on outside 
funds for loans. This variable ranged from .01 to 22.5, with ten of the branches having 
ratios greater than five. It appears that outside sources are providing ample funding for 
many of the branches. Other studies have reported the negative affects of outside 
funding on loan recovery [Christen, Von Pischke, 1980]. Thus, the larger the 
LNS _TO_ DEP value, the poorer the branch's loan recovery experience and the more 
likely this variable will have a negative coefficient. 
The branch's net income (BR_ NET_ Y) is the difference between gross income and 
gross expenses. In a well functioning system, to obtain a large net income a branch must 
recover a sizeable amount of the interest owed on its loans. But since interest income 
in Bangladesh is as based on the accrual method, i.e., reported income is based on 
earnings from both active and inactive loans in the branch's portfolio, the sign of 
BR_ NET_ Y's estimated coefficient is expected to be positive. This variable does not 
directly have an effect on loan recovery; however, it does demonstrate why poor recovery 
can be ignored by lenders. 
The sign of the variable for the ratio of operating-income-to-operating-expenses, 
OPY _TO_ OPEXP, provides information on how policy should be directed toward income 
and expense issues. A negative coefficient suggests that in order to increase the 
dependent variable this variable should decrease in size. This can be accomplished by 
either decreasing the numerator (operating income), something most enterprises do not 
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wish to do, or by increasing the branches' operating expenses. Included in operating 
expenses are employee salaries and benefits, rents and depreciation, "lighting, insurance, 
stationary, telephone, postage, repairs and maintenance, business development expenses, 
remittance charges, and miscellaneous expenses" [Srinivasan and Meyer 1986, pp. 4-5]. 
The operating income of the branch represents non-interest income, i.e., from 
commissions, service fees, and miscellaneous income. Owing to a lack of other sources 
of income in the rural areas, it is not surprising that this income is low for rural 
branches, since their primary business is disbursing loans. This observation is further 
reflected in the loan-to- deposit ratio where almost half of the branches in the sample 
had a ratio greater than one and ten branches had ratios greater than five. 
The final explanatory variable, NETY _TO_ GRSY, is the ratio of the branch's net-
income-to-its-gross-income. A negative estimated coefficient suggests that recovery 
performance can be increased by raising the branches' operating expenses, i.e., increase 
salaries, benefits and other costs part of which would be expected to be spent on loan 
recovery. 
The Model 
A model was developed to explain recovery performance using the variables listed 
above. The first four variables described in the previous section serve as alternative 
measures of recovery performance. The model was estimated by ordinary least squares. 
It was specified as follows (the expected signs of the coefficients are listed in parenthesis 
beneath the variables): 
' . 
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Y-b0 + b1#_AG_LNS + b2AG_LNS_OUTS + b3PERS + b4BANKTYPE + 
(?) (?) (+) (-) 
b5BR_AGE + b6BM_EXP + b7TARGET + b8LNS_TO_DEP + b9BR_NET_Y + 
(+) (+) (-) (-) (+) 
b100PY_TO_OPEXP + b11NETY_TO_GRSY 
(?) (?) 
where Y is either one of the actual recovery amounts (AG VOL COLL, TOT VOL-
- - -
_COLL) or one of the collection ratios (AG_ REC_ RATE, TOT_ REC_ RATE). The models 
were tested for the presence of collinearity and heteroscedasticity, and both tests proved 
positive. The presence of collinearity was detected using the methodology set forth by 
Belsley, et. al.. This problem was remedied by utilizing the ridge regression option of 
Shazam's OLS subroutine, as suggested by Johnston. The arbitrary constant, k, utilized 
in the ridge regression was selected at the level where the collinear coefficients of each 
model stabilized. Heteroscedasticity was handled by utilizing the square root value of 
each observation's variables in the models and by employing Shazam's HETCOV option, 
which corrects for heteroscedasticity. 
Results 
The parameter estimates of the four ridge regression models are shown in Table 
2. Most of the coefficients were significant at the 5 percent level of confidence and had 
the expected signs. The reported R-square values (between .43 and .32) are reasonable 
for this type of study. The remaining unexplained variation in loan recovery performance 
may be due to the lack of borrower information since the models only utilized bank level 
data. 
CONSTANT 
# AG I.NS 
AG I.NS OUTS 
PERS 
BANK.TYPE 
BR AGE 
BM EXP 
TARGET 
I.NS TO DEP 
BR NET Y 
- -
OPY TO OPEXP 
NETY TO GRSY 
R-Sq. 
R-Sq, Adj. 
@ 
k 
Table 2 
Ridge Regression Results of the Four Models Estimated* 
MODEL 
AG VOL COLL TOT VOL COLL AG REC RATE TOT REC RATE 
- - - - - - - -
6.7033 
(1. 83) 
0 .1265** 
(5.74) 
0.0899** 
(10.2) 
2 .1637** 
(5.03) 
-3.438** 
(-4.89) 
1. 3365** 
(2.70) 
0.5522 
(1. 33) 
0.0269** 
(3.95) 
0. 9666** 
(3.34) 
0. 0739** 
(2.28) 
-3. 4307** 
(-6.11) 
-3 .143** 
(-2.9) 
.43 
.34 
.9 
3.4814 
(0.85) 
0.0894 
(1. 23) 
0.0873** 
(7.75) 
3. 6305** 
(6.83) 
-4. 0919** 
(-4.53) 
2. 8552** 
(4.03) 
2. 0417** 
(2.89) 
0.0265** 
(2.89) 
1. 2364** 
(3.55) 
0.1026** 
(2. 71) 
-5. 3815** 
(-6.72) 
-2.758** 
(-2.02) 
.37 
.27 
.7 
0. 6252** 
(8.61) 
-0. 0345** 
(-5.22) 
-0. 006** 
(-3.60) 
0. 03** 
(3.30) 
-0. 0344** 
(-3.12) 
0.04** 
(1. 97) 
0.0483** 
(3.67) 
-0.0057** 
(-2.77) 
-0. 0591 ** 
(-8.29) 
0.0006 
(0.13) 
-0. 0801 ** 
(-3.07) 
-0 .1328** 
(-5.10) 
.32 
.21 
.6 
0.6771** 
(4.58) 
-0.0414** 
(-6.17) 
-0.0045** 
(-2.62) 
0.0314** 
(3.14) 
-0.0514** 
(-4.43) 
0.0382 
(1.71) 
0. 0483** 
(3. 77) 
-o. 008** 
(-3.42) 
-0. 0597** 
(-7.84) 
-0.0007 
(-1.19) 
-0. 0916** 
(-3.36) 
-0 .1132** 
(-4.25) 
.37 
.27 
.5 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
*Results were obtained using the SHAZAM IBM-PC software program. 
Figures in parenthesis are t-ratio of the coefficients. 
**significantly different from zero at the 5% confidence level. 
8Arbitrary constant required in the Ridge Regression procedure. 
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Branch collection performance, defined by the volume variables, was positively 
related to the number of agricultural borrowers, the volume of the agricultural loans 
outstanding, the loan target assigned to the branch, and the branch's loan-to-deposit ratio 
for 1984. Thus, when loan recovery is positive, more loans generate more loan recovery. 
When recovery performance is defined as the ratio of loan payments received to 
loans disbursed, the coefficients of these same four variables change signs. Recovery 
performance decreases with an increase in the number of agricultural borrowers, the 
volume of the agricultural loans outstanding, the loan target assigned to the branch, and 
the branch's loan-to-deposit ratio. These findings support the argument that increasing 
the number of loans and loan volume disbursed hinders lending personnel from 
adequately administering loan portfolios. This implies that rural bankers in Bangladesh 
largely disburse and record rural loans, and then forget about them. 
The coefficients of the remaining explanatory factors had their expected signs. 
The BANK1YPE coefficients were all negative, implying that NCB branches have a worse 
recovery position than do BKB branches. The positive sign of the PERS, BR_ AGE, and 
BM_ EXP variables imply that both the volume recovered and the collection ratio should 
increase with an increase in the number of personnel employed at a branch, with the age 
of the branch, and with the branch manager's years of experience. 
The bank management efficiency variables were also significant for all four models. 
The results for the loan-to-deposit ratio variable suggest the need to generate more 
deposits relative to the volume of loans made in order to improve the loan collections. 
According to the results, an increase in branch net income should also increase the 
volume of loans recovered as well as improve its recovery rate. The results also suggest 
.. 
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that both the volume recovered as well as the collection ratios can be increased by 
reducing the operating-income-to-operating-expense ratio and the ratio of net-income-to-
gross-income efficiency measures. Due to the limited income generating opportunities 
in rural areas, the operating income of most rural branches in Bangladesh are probably 
at their maximum levels. Since salaries are a major component of branch operating 
expenses, OPY TO OPEXP can be reduced by hiring more personnel [Srinivasan]. The 
NE1Y _TO_ GRSY variable further supports this notion. By increasing labor expenses, a 
branch's net income should decrease but better recovery will cause the gross income 
reported by the branch to be realized income earnings rather than accrued earnings. 
Similar results were reported by the TBAC study. Increasing gross income, 
lowering operating expenses, improving the salary scale, generating more deposits, 
expanding the loan portfolio and gaining more bank experience were associated with 
better collection results [TBAC, p. 96]. 
Concludin2 Comments 
This paper presents the results of a model explaining rural loan recovery 
performance in Bangladesh using operating efficiency and several bank, manager, and 
loan characteristics as explanatory variables. Collection performance was evaluated for 
agricultural loans as well as for the total number of loans disbursed, because rural 
branches also offered non-agricultural loans. Loan recovery was measured as the total 
amount collected and as the ratio of the amount collected to the amount disbursed as 
of 31 December 1984. Models using the second definition were preferable since they 
provided more information, i.e., the success of the branch in recovering at least the 
amount of funds disbursed that year. 
' . 
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Better collection occurs at older branches and at those branches having managers 
with more banking experience. Based on this finding, bank's should institute a policy of 
assigning more experienced managers to rural branches, if the banks truly wish to 
increase loan recovery. Working against this recommendation is the perception by most 
bank officials in Bangladesh of being posted in rural branches as a form of punishment 
rather than as a reward. Perhaps this perception could be softened by offering more 
benefits to experienced managers assigned to rural branches. 
Recovery levels should also increase by hiring more bank personnel for the rural 
branches. This recommendation is also supported by the significant negative signs of the 
coefficients for two of the policy variables, OPY _TO_ OPEXP and NE'IY _TO_ GRSY, 
which suggest that recovery can be improved by increasing the branches' operating 
expenses. Salaries presently account for the majority of these expenses. 
At the national level, government intervention in lending procedures was found 
to impede the branch collection performance (i.e., the negative sign of the TARGET, 
OPY _TO_ OPEXP, and NE'IY _TO_ GRSY variables). The increased lending caused by 
supply-leading policies has surpassed the capacity of the branches to make and properly 
administer new loans, i.e., the volume lent has grown too fast for the number of 
personnel assigned to the branch [Ahmed]. Eliminating loan targeting programs, and 
allowing branch personnel to decide which economic activities and which borrowers to 
fund, should improve loan recovery. Also by eliminating interest rate ceilings, the lenders 
could charge borrowers interest rates that adequately reflect the lenders' costs of making 
and collecting loans, particularly the borrower's credit risks. 
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If loan recovery remains at its current low levels in Bangladesh, the viability of 
the formal financial institutions operating in rural areas will be undermined unless they 
are given continuous infusions of outside funds. Such a policy has been shown to 
undermine the development of rural financial markets and is counterproductive 
[Sanderatne ]. A poor government, such as Bangladesh's, is not in a position to 
simultaneously subsidize a large number of borrowers. This hinders the income 
distribution objectives of the supply-leading policy and skews the distribution in favor of 
the more powerful members of rural society rather than the rural poor, the stated 
recipients of these loans. 
Given the fact that only one year of data were used to test the model, these 
results must be considered tentative. The conclusions reached would be stronger if the 
data included the amount of loans coming due each year, the value of the portfolio's 
overdue loans, and branch deposit information for more than one year. However, the 
findings reported in the paper are consistent with the view that heavy government 
intervention in rural financial markets can hinder their development. 
' ' 
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Table A 
Dependent and Independent Variables Characteristics 
VARIABLE MEAN MEDIAN ST. DEV.* RANGE 
AG VOL COLL 980 569 16.06 26-11589 
- -
TOT VOL COLL 1,429 793 18.74 26-12691 
- -
AG REC RATE 0.49 0.29 0.34 .01-5.10 
TOT REC RATE 0.50 0.34 0.32 .02-5.10 
- -
# AG LNS 739 482 13.40 0-3259 
AG LNS OUTS 7005 4871 36.90 15-29721 
- -
PERS 12.4 11 0. 71 4-35 
BANKTYPE 0. 72 1 0.46 0-1 
BR AGE 8 7 0.73 2-21 
BM EXP 6.5 6 0. 77 1-18 
TARGET 3687 1101 39.59 0-27772 
LNS TO DEP 2.32 1 0.94 .01-22.487 
BR NET Y 445.3 234 15.02 -198-7495 
OPY TO OPEXP 0.52 0.24 0.42 0-3.72 
NETY TO GRSY 0.18 0.18 0.33 -0.462-0.897 
Ag. loans outstanding 0.85 0.95 0.13 .17-1 
to total loans outstanding 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
*The standard deviations are of the square-root transformed variables. 
Source: Rural Bank and Bank Users Survey (RBBUS), Branch Manager Survey. 
, . 
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